The political economy of anititrust [i.e. antitrust]
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
The political economy of anititrust [i.e. antitrust]
（Contributions to economic analysis, 282）
Elsevier, 2007
- : hbk
- Other Title
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The political economy of antitrust
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Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limitations in antitrust enforcement and the institutional structure of the antitrust agencies. Examining issues related to the political-economy of antitrust is important as antitrust policy and enforcement provide a key mechanism for preserving the competitiveness of markets, with implications for innovation, efficiency, growth and welfare. This book brings together contributions by leading academic researchers in the areas of political-economy, cartels, merger and non-merger enforcement, as well as economists working with antitrust authorities in the U.S. and E.U., to make a timely contribution for researchers and practitioners. The chapters in this volume cover the full range of topics: enforcement of cartels; merger control; monopolization and abuse of dominance; and systemic issues in antitrust enforcement and policy. Since the last few years have seen significant changes in both the U.S. and E.U. in the attitudes towards cartels, the book places emphasis on antitrust enforcement of cartels, including topics such as the corporate leniency programs that have recently been introduced in the U.S. and E.U., optimal deterrence mechanisms against cartels and detection of cartels. While the individual chapters of the book make independent contributions and may be read separately, the book brings together articles from various sub-areas to present a more encompassing picture. The first chapter provides an overview of some of the trends and recent research in antitrust enforcement and policy and highlights the contributions made by the chapters in this volume.
Table of Contents
Issues in Antitrust Enforcement, Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics. The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path. Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison? Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests. Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel. Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis. The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger. The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests. A Consumers Surplus Defense in Merger Control. EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment. The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice. Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers. Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator. Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law. Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive? Antitrust in Open Economies.
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