The political economy of regulation
著者
書誌事項
The political economy of regulation
(Business economics, 5)(An Elgar reference collection)
E. Elgar, c2007
大学図書館所蔵 全14件
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This volume collects a set of important articles that provides a wealth of broad insights into the causes and consequences of regulation. They show beyond doubt that this field of study is remarkably lively and filled with controversy.
The first two parts of the book introduce the essential economic content of the issues that regulation deals with, covering the main 'market failures' that are addressed, and then turning specifically to the causes and consequences of regulation in these areas. The next section presents a series of papers dealing with various phases of the policy life cycle, and the concluding part investigates the role of corporate self-regulation.
目次
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Thomas P. Lyon
PART I TARGETS OF REGULATION
1. Harold Demsetz (1968), 'Why Regulate Utilities?'
2. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with Respect to CATV'
3. R.H. Coase (1960), 'The Problem of Social Cost'
4. Martin L. Weitzman (1974), 'Prices vs. Quantities'
5. Hayne E. Leland (1979), 'Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards'
PART II CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATION
6. Gordon Tullock (1967), 'The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft'
7. Sam Peltzman (1976), 'Toward a More General Theory of Regulation'
8. Gary S. Becker (1983), 'A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence'
9. Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan (1984), 'Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics'
10. Gregg A. Jarrell (1978), 'The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry'
11. George L. Priest (1993), 'The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation" Debate'
12. James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1975), 'Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes'
13. Michael T. Maloney and Robert E. McCormick (1982), 'A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation'
14. B. Peter Pashigian (1985), 'Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?'
15. Sam Peltzman (1975), 'The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation'
PART III POLITICAL CONTROL, ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND ENFORCEMENT
16. Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran (1983), 'Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission'
17. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll and Barry R. Weingast (1989), 'Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies'
18. Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation'
19. Daniel McFadden (1976), 'The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence'
20. Thomas P. Lyon and John W. Mayo (2005) 'Regulatory Opportunism and Investment Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry'
21. P. Fenn and C.G. Veljanovski (1988), 'A Positive Economic Theory of Regulatory Enforcement'
22. David Weil (1996), 'If OSHA is So Bad, Why is Compliance So Good?'
PART IV SELF-REGULATION
23. Sheoli Pargal and David Wheeler (1996), 'Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from Indonesia'
24. John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon and Steven C. Hackett (2000), 'Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism'
Name Index
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