Mechanism design with collusive auditing : a three-tier agency model with "monotone comparative statics" and an implication for corporate governance

Bibliographic Information

Mechanism design with collusive auditing : a three-tier agency model with "monotone comparative statics" and an implication for corporate governance

Yutaka Suzuki

(Working paper / Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University, no. 128 . ガバナンスの比較セクター分析 : ゲーム理論+契約理論によるアプローチシリーズ||ガバナンス ノ ヒカク セクター ブンセキ : ゲーム リロン ケイヤク リロン ニヨル アプローチ シリーズ ; no. 1)

Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University, 2007

Other Title

Mechanism design with collusive auditing : a three tier agency model with monotone comparative statics and an implication for corporate governance

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Note

Includes bibliographical references (p. 30)

Related Books: 1-1 of 1

  • Working paper

    Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University

    Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University

Details

  • NCID
    BA82407375
  • Country Code
    ja
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Machida
  • Pages/Volumes
    32 p.
  • Size
    30 cm
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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