Mechanism design with collusive auditing : a three-tier agency model with "monotone comparative statics" and an implication for corporate governance
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Mechanism design with collusive auditing : a three-tier agency model with "monotone comparative statics" and an implication for corporate governance
（Working paper / Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University, no. 128 . ガバナンスの比較セクター分析 : ゲーム理論+契約理論によるアプローチシリーズ||ガバナンス ノ ヒカク セクター ブンセキ : ゲーム リロン ケイヤク リロン ニヨル アプローチ シリーズ ; no. 1）
Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University, 2007
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Mechanism design with collusive auditing : a three tier agency model with monotone comparative statics and an implication for corporate governance
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Includes bibliographical references (p. 30)
