CiNii 図書 - Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance

著者

Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance

edited by Donato Masciandaro, Marc Quintyn

E. Elgar, 2007

Includes bibliographical references and index

HTTP:URL=http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007011643.html Information=Table of contents only

Robust regulators and their political masters : independence and accountability in theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor
Independence and accountability in supervision : general principles and European setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial supervisors in practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor
Independence and accountability : why politics matters / Johnathan Westrup
Governance in banking supervision : theory and practices / Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini
Financial supervision architecture and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro
Architectures of supervisory authorities and banking supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini
Experience with integrated supervisors : governance and quality of supervision / Martin Čihák and Richard Podpiera
Financial supervisors : alternative models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine di Noia
Budgetary governance of banking supervision : a primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriëtte Prast
Bureaucrats or politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini
Agency problems in banking supervision / Robert A. Eisenbeis