Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Designing financial supervision institutions : independence, accountability and governance
E. Elgar, 2007
Available at 7 libraries
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
HTTP:URL=http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0715/2007011643.html Information=Table of contents only
Contents of Works
- Robust regulators and their political masters : independence and accountability in theory / Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor
- Independence and accountability in supervision : general principles and European setting / Lorenzo Bini Smaghi
- The fear of freedom : politicians and the independence and accountability of financial supervisors in practice / Marc Quintyn, Silvia Ramirez and Michael W. Taylor
- Independence and accountability : why politics matters / Johnathan Westrup
- Governance in banking supervision : theory and practices / Marco Arnone, Salim M. Darbar and Alessandro Gambini
- Financial supervision architecture and central bank independence / Andreas Freytag and Donato Masciandaro
- Architectures of supervisory authorities and banking supervision / Marco Arnone and Alessandro Gambini
- Experience with integrated supervisors : governance and quality of supervision / Martin Čihák and Richard Podpiera
- Financial supervisors : alternative models / Giorgio Di Giorgio and Carmine di Noia
- Budgetary governance of banking supervision : a primer / Donato Masciandaro, Maria Nieto and Henriëtte Prast
- Bureaucrats or politicians? / Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini
- Agency problems in banking supervision / Robert A. Eisenbeis