Trust and mistrust in international relations


Trust and mistrust in international relations

Andrew H. Kydd

Princeton University Press, 2007, c2005

  • : pbk

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"Third printing, and first paperback printing, 2007"--T.p. verso

Includes bibliographical references (p. [257]-277) and index



The difference between war and peace can be a matter of trust. States that trust each other can cooperate and remain at peace. States that mistrust each other enough can wage preventive wars, attacking now in fear that the other side will attack in the future. In this groundbreaking book, Andrew Kydd develops a theory of trust in international relations and applies it to the Cold War. Grounded in a realist tradition but arriving at conclusions very different from current realist approaches, this theory is the first systematic game theoretic approach to trust in international relations, and is also the first to explicitly consider how we as external observers should make inferences about the trustworthiness of states. Kydd makes three major claims. First, while trustworthy states may enter conflict, when we see conflict we should become more convinced that the states involved are untrustworthy. Second, strong states, traditionally thought to promote cooperation, can do so only if they are relatively trustworthy. Third, even states that strongly mistrust each other can reassure each other and cooperate provided they are trustworthy. The book's historical chapters focus on the growing mistrust at the beginning of the Cold War. Contrary to the common view that both sides were willing to compromise but failed because of mistrust, Kydd argues that most of the mistrust in the Cold War was justified, because the Soviets were not trustworthy.


List of Figures xi List of Tables xiii Acknowledgments xv PART I Trust and International Relations CHAPTER 1: Introduction 3 Defining Trust 6 Trust and International Relations 12 Methodology 22 A Road Map 25 Conclusion 26 CHAPTER 2: Trust and the Security Dilemma 28 The Security Dilemma Game 29 Introducing Uncertainty 34 Equilibria with Uncertainty 36 Achieving Cooperation 38 The Effects of Cooperation and Noncooperation 41 Conclusion 44 Appendix 45 PART II Fear and the Origins of the Cold War CHAPTER 3: The Spiral of Fear 49 The Spiral Model 50 The Spiral Game 52 Equilibria in the Spiral Game 59 Defection and Fear 63 The External Observer's Perspective 68 Conclusion 77 Appendix 77 CHAPTER 4: The Origins of Mistrust: 1945-50 79 Explaining the Origins of the Cold War 80 Setting the Stage: Motivations and Beliefs in 1945 87 The Fate of Poland 92 Bulgaria and Romania 98 The Iranian Crisis 101 The Turkish Crisis 105 The Truman Doctrine 108 Hungary and Czechoslovakia 110 The Korean War 113 Conclusion 115 PART III European Cooperation and the Rebirth of Germany CHAPTER 5: Trust, Hegemony, and Cooperation 119 Multilateral Cooperation 120 The Multilateral Trust Game 123 Equilibria in the Game 132 The Payoffs and Cooperation 134 Geography and Mistrust 136 Hegemony and Cooperation 137 Conclusion 139 Appendix 140 CHAPTER 6: European Cooperation and Germany, 1945-55 142 Explaining European Cooperation 143 The Road to Bizonia 149 The Origins of the Western Bloc: 1947 156 The Brussels Pact and the London Accords 162 The Birth of NATO and West Germany 165 German Rearmament 168 The Death of the EDC and the NATO Solution 173 The Perspectives Revisited 177 Conclusion 178 PART IV Reassurance and the End of the Cold War CHAPTER 7: Reassurance 183 Reassurance in International Relations 184 The Reassurance Game 188 Equilibria in the Reassurance Game 190 Costly Signals versus Cheap Talk 197 The Size of the Signal 198 When Reassurance Works 200 Conclusion 204 Appendix 205 CHAPTER 8: The End of the Cold War: 1985-91 214 Explaining the End of the Cold War 215 New Thinking before 1985 223 The Advent of Gorbachev 225 The INF Treaty 227 Afghanistan, Liberalization, and the UN Speech 230 The Sinatra Doctrine 234 Less Socialism, More Unity 237 The End of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire 240 The Depth of Trust 242 Conclusion 244 PART V Trust and Mistrust in the Post-Cold War Era CHAPTER 9: Conclusion 247 The Solitary Superpower 248 The Post-Cold War Decade 251 The Twenty-first Century 252 Bibliography 257 Index 279

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  • ISBN
    • 9780691133881
  • LCCN
  • 出版国コード
  • タイトル言語コード
  • 本文言語コード
  • 出版地
    Princeton, N.J.
  • ページ数/冊数
    xvi, 284 p.
  • 大きさ
    24 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名