Bibliographic Information

Political institutions and financial development

edited by Stephen Haber, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast

(Social science history)

Stanford University Press, 2008

  • : cloth
  • : pbk

Available at  / 24 libraries

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Includes bibliographical references and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Economists have long maintained that a well-developed and functioning financial system is a vital prerequisite to economic growth. Countries with robust banking sectors and securities markets-that is, countries in which credit cards, loans, mortgages, and the ability to issue stocks and bonds are available to a broad swath of consumers and businesses-are more prosperous than countries that restrict such access to a favored elite. What is less clear is why some countries develop better financial systems than others. The essays in this volume employ the insights and techniques of political science, economics, and history to provide a fresh answer to this question. While scholarly tradition points to the colonial origin of a country's legal system as the most important determinant of the health of its financial system, this volume points instead to a country's political institutions-its governmental structures and the rules of the political game-as the key. Specifically, the openness and competitiveness of a country's political system tends to reflect itself in the openness and competitiveness of its financial system.

Table of Contents

Contents Contributors 000 Acknowledgments 000 Chapter 1: Political Institutions and Financial Development 000 Stephen Haber, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast Chapter 2: Political Institutions and Financial Development: Evidence from the Political Economy of Bank Regulation in Mexico and the United States 000 Stephen Haber Chapter 3: The Political Economy of Early U.S. Financial Development 000 Richard Sylla Chapter 4: Answering Mary Shirley's Question, or: What Can the World Bank Learn from American History? 000 John Joseph Wallis Chapter 5: Beyond Legal Origin and Checks and Balances: Political Credibility, Citizen Information, and Financial Sector Development 000 Philip Keefer Chapter 6: The Microeconomic Effects of Different Approaches to Bank Supervision 000 James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine Chapter 7: Political Drivers of Diverging Corporate Governance Patterns 000 Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn Chapter 8: Credible Commitment and Sovereign Default Risk: Two Bond Markets and Imperial Brazil 000 William R. Summerhill Chapter 9: Legal Origin vs. the Politics of Creditor Rights: Bond Markets in Brazil, 1850\-2002 000 Aldo Musacchio Chapter 10: Conclusion: Economics, Political Institutions, and Financial Markets 000 Douglass C. North and Mary Shirley Index 000

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