Democratic authority : a philosophical framework
著者
書誌事項
Democratic authority : a philosophical framework
Princeton University Press, c2008
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. [295]-302) and index
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
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ISBN 9780691124179
内容説明
Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In "Democratic Authority", David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the 'epistemic value' of the procedure - the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision - is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn't simply rule. Estlund's theory - which he calls 'epistemic proceduralism' - avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view.
If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic - with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.
目次
Preface ix CHAPTER I: Democratic Authority 1 CHAPTER II: Truth and Despotism 21 CHAPTER III: An Acceptability Requirement 40 CHAPTER IV: The Limits of Fair Procedure 65 CHAPTER V: The Flight from Substance 85 CHAPTER VI: Epistemic Proceduralism 98 CHAPTER VII: Authority and Normative Consent 117 CHAPTER VIII: Original Authority and the Democracy/Jury Analogy 136 CHAPTER IX: How Would Democracy Know? 159 CHAPTER X: The Real Speech Situation 184 CHAPTER XI: Why Not an Epistocracy of the Educated? 206 CHAPTER XII: The Irrelevance of the Jury Theorem 223 CHAPTER XIII: Rejecting the Democracy/Contractualism Analogy 237 ChAPTER XIV: Utopophobia: Concession and Aspiration in Democratic Theory 258 Notes 277 Bibliography 295 Index 303
- 巻冊次
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: pbk ISBN 9780691143248
内容説明
Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn't simply rule. Estlund's theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view.
If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.
目次
Preface ix CHAPTER I: Democratic Authority 1 CHAPTER II: Truth and Despotism 21 CHAPTER III: An Acceptability Requirement 40 CHAPTER IV: The Limits of Fair Procedure 65 CHAPTER V: The Flight from Substance 85 CHAPTER VI: Epistemic Proceduralism 98 CHAPTER VII: Authority and Normative Consent 117 CHAPTER VIII: Original Authority and the Democracy/Jury Analogy 136 CHAPTER IX: How Would Democracy Know? 159 CHAPTER X: The Real Speech Situation 184 CHAPTER XI: Why Not an Epistocracy of the Educated? 206 CHAPTER XII: The Irrelevance of the Jury Theorem 223 CHAPTER XIII: Rejecting the Democracy/Contractualism Analogy 237 ChAPTER XIV: Utopophobia: Concession and Aspiration in Democratic Theory 258 Notes 277 Bibliography 295 Index 303
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