Answering for crime : responsibility and liability in the criminal law
著者
書誌事項
Answering for crime : responsibility and liability in the criminal law
(Legal theory today)
Hart, 2007
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 299-316) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this long-awaited book, Antony Duff offers a new perspective on the structures of criminal law and criminal liability. His starting point is a distinction between responsibility (understood as answerability) and liability, and a conception of responsibility as relational and practice-based. This focus on responsibility, as a matter of being answerable to those who have the standing to call one to account, throws new light on a range of questions in criminal law theory: on the question of criminalization, which can now be cast as the question of what we should have to answer for, and to whom, under the threat of criminal conviction and punishment; on questions about the criminal trial, as a process through which defendants are called to answer, and about the conditions (bars to trial) given which a trial would be illegitimate; on questions about the structure of offences, the distinction between offences and defences, and the phenomena of strict liability and strict responsibility; and on questions about the structures of criminal defences.
The net result is not a theory of criminal law; but it is an account of the structure of criminal law as an institution through which a liberal polity defines a realm of public wrongdoing, and calls those who perpetrate (or are accused of perpetrating) such wrongs to account.
目次
Introduction 1. The 'General Part' and the 'Special Part' 2. A Normative Theory of Criminal Law? 3. Answering for Crime 1. Responsibility and Liability 1. Responsibility and Liability 2. Responsibility as Relational 3. Prospective and Retrospective Responsibilities 2. Responsible as What, to Whom? 1. Who can be Responsible? 2. As What Are We Criminally Responsible? (a) Territories, Sovereigns and Subjects (b) Moral Agents c) Citizens 3. Civic Criminal Responsibility 3. Responsible For What? 1. Control as Necessary for Responsibility 2. What Can We Control? (a) Thoughts, Emotions and Character (b) Intended and Expected Outcomes (c) Risks Foreseen and Unforeseen 3. The 'Epistemic Condition': A Condition of Responsibility, or of Liability? 4. Criminally Responsible For What? (1) Crimes as Wrongs 1. Preliminaries 2. Crimes as Wrongs 3. Moral Wrongfulness as Condition or as Object of Criminal Responsibility? 4. Mala Prohibita as Wrongs 5. Criminally Responsible For What? (2) Action and Crime 1. The 'Act Requirement' 2. The Failure of the Act Requirement 3. Social Agency and the 'Action Presumption' 4. Criminal Responsibility for Thoughts? 5. Criminal Responsibility for Involuntary Movements and States of Affairs? 6. Criminal Responsibility for Omissions 7. Action and Character 6. Criminally Responsible For What? (3) Harms, Wrongs and Crimes 1. Clarifying the Harm Principle 2. Harm and Wrongs 3. Harms, Risks and Remote Harms 4. Giving Harm its Due 5. Crimes as Public Wrongs 7. Structures of Crime: Attacks and Endangerments 1. Attacks and Endangerments (a) Distinguishing Attacks from Endangerments (b) The Significance of the Distinction (c) Legislating the Distinction? 2. Extending the Law? (a) Attacks and Preparations (b) Endangerment and 'Remote' Harms 3. 'Implicit Endangerment' and Mala Prohibita (a) 'Implicit Endangerment' and Civic Responsibility (b) Pure(r) Mala Prohibita
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