Foundations in microeconomic theory : a volume in honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein
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Bibliographic Information
Foundations in microeconomic theory : a volume in honor of Hugo F. Sonnenschein
Springer, c2008
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Includes bibliographical references
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This volume collects papers from Hugo Sonnenschein's students. It aims to demonstrate his tremendous impact as an advisor. The papers span decades and present some of the most important articles in microeconomic theory. Each paper is accompanied with a preface by the student providing background on the paper and indicating Hugo's influence on its genesis. The papers all lie in microeconomic theory, and moreover all make fundamental contributions to the foundations of the theory.
Table of Contents
An Existence Theorem for the Second Best.- An Equilibrium Model with Involuntary Unemployment at Flexible, Competitive Prices and Wages.- Price Distortion and Potential Welfare.- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance.- Residential Land Use.- Cournot Equilibrium with Free Entry.- Power, Majority Voting, and Linear Income Tax Schedules.- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium.- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information.- Finitely Repeated Games.- Nonpaternalistic Sympathy and the Inefficiency of Consistent Intertemporal Plans.- Strategy-Proof Exchange.- Dynamic Monopoly with Nondurable Goods.- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria.- Unobservable Investment and the Hold-up Problem.- The Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Social Choice Correspondences: A General Formulation and a Limit Result.- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games.- Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: Breaking Down Backward Induction.- Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games.- Player Type Distributions as State Variables and Information Revelation in Zero Sum Repeated Games with Discounting.- Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships.- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods.
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