Law, informal rules and economic performance : the case for common law
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Law, informal rules and economic performance : the case for common law
Edward Elgar, c2008
- : cased
- : pbk
Available at 12 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Capitalism has outperformed all other systems and maintained a positive growth rate since it began. Svetozar Pejovich makes the case within this book that a major reason for the success of capitalism lies in the efficiency-friendly incentives of its basic institutions, which continuously adjust the rules of the game to the requirements of economic progress. The analysis throughout is consistent and is supported by evidence. Key components of the proposed theory are the rule of law, the market for institutions, the interaction thesis, the carriers of change, and the process of changing formal and informal institutions.
This book will be of great interest to academics and students of law and economics, new institutional economics, comparative systems and public choice throughout the world and especially in East Asia and South America where institutional issues are being debated.
Table of Contents
Contents:
Foreword by Leonard P. Liggio
Preface and Acknowledgments
PART I: BASIC ECONOMIC CONCEPTS
1. The Game and the Rules of the Game
2. Transaction Costs
PART II: TRANSFORMATION OF THE MEDIEVAL COMMUNITY INTO MODERN SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM, THE RULE OF LAW AND CAPITALISM
3. From the Middle Ages to Capitalism
4. Capitalism and the Rule of Law
Appendix: Afraid to be Free: Dependency as Desideraturm
James M. Buchanan
5. The Law of Contract and the Judiciary
6. The Economic Functions of the Constitution
7. Private Property Rights
8. Capitalism, Economic Freedom and Performance
9. The Rule of Law and Capitalism: An Overview
PART III: TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
10. The Method of Analysis
11. The Interaction Thesis
12. The Carriers of Change: The Role of Entrepreneurs
13. Formal Institutions
14. Informal Institutions or Cultural Traditions: The Role of Pathfinders
15. Efficiency-Friendly Institutional Change within the Structure of Tradition
Index
by "Nielsen BookData"