Spy satellites : and other intelligence technologies that changed history
著者
書誌事項
Spy satellites : and other intelligence technologies that changed history
University of Washington Press, c2007
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全3件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-159) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Much has been said and written about the failure of U.S. intelligence to prevent the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and its overestimation of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction under Saddam Hussein. This book focuses instead on the central role that intelligence-collection systems play in promoting arms control and disarmament.
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. and Keith Hansen bring more than fifty combined years of experience to this discussion of the capabilities of technical systems, which are primarily based in space. Their history of the rapid advancement of surveillance technology is a window into a dramatic reconceptualization of Cold War strategies and policy planning. Graham and Hansen focus on the intelligence successes against Soviet strategic nuclear forces and the quality of the intelligence that has made possible accurate assessments of WMD programs in North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Their important insights shed a much-needed light on the process of verifying how the world harnesses the proliferation of nuclear arms and the continual drive for advancements in technology.
目次
Foreword by Robert M. Huffstutler
Preface and Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. To Verity or Not to Verify
2. Soviet Secrecy Fuels the Arms Race and Inhibits Verification
3. U.S. Efforts to Understand Soviet Military Forces and Capabilities
4. Strategic Arms Control Legitimizes Space-Based Reconnaissance
5. Intelligence Support to Arms Control Activities
6. National Technical Means of Verification Takes Center Stage
7. "National Technical Means" Goes Multilateral
8. Monitoring the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
9. Conclusion
Postscript
Appendixes
A. Glossary of Acronyms and Terms
B. Texts of NTM Provisions in Arms Control Agreements
C. Chronology of Key U.S. Reconnaissance Capabilities
D. U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS)
E. CTBT International Monitoring System
F. U.S. Intelligence Community
Notes
Bibliography
About the Authors
Index
「Nielsen BookData」 より