Bibliographic Information

Performance Evaluation

Peter O. Christensen, Gerald A. Feltham

(Springer series in accounting scholarship, . Economics of accounting ; v. 2)

Springer, c2008

  • paper

Available at  / 15 libraries

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Note

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This book provides an integrated, technical exposition of key concepts in agency theory, with particular emphasis on analyses of the economic consequences of the characteristics of contractible performance measures, such as accounting reports. It provides a succinct source for learning the fundamentals of the economics of incentives. It will appeal to accounting researchers as well as those in other disciplines who are interested in the economics of management incentives.

Table of Contents

Foreword to Volume I.- Preface to Volume I.- Preface to Volume II.- Introduction to Performance Evaluation.- Optimal Contracts.- Ex Post Performance Measures.- Linear Contracts.- Multiple Tasks and Multiple Performance Measures.- Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers as Performance Measures.- Post-contract, Pre-decision Information.- Pre-contract Information - Uninformed Principal Moves First.- Intra-period Contract Renegotiation.- Multi-period Contracts with Full Commitment and Independent Periods.- Timing and Correlation of Reports in a Multi-period LEN Model.- Full Commitment Contacts with Interdependent Periods.- Inter-period Contract Renegotiation.- Contracting with Multiple Productive Agents.- Contracting with a Productive Agent and a Monitor.- References.- Author Index.- Subject Index.

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Details

  • NCID
    BA87003894
  • ISBN
    • 9780387745770
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    New York
  • Pages/Volumes
    xxii, 664 p.
  • Size
    25 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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