Corporate governance : promises kept, promises broken
著者
書誌事項
Corporate governance : promises kept, promises broken
Princeton University Press, c2008
大学図書館所蔵 全22件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Even in the wake of the biggest financial crash of the postwar era, the United States continues to rely on Securities and Exchange Commission oversight and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which set tougher rules for boards, management, and public accounting firms to protect the interests of shareholders. Such reliance is badly misplaced. In "Corporate Governance", Jonathan Macey argues that less government regulation - not more - is what's needed to ensure that managers of public companies keep their promises to investors. Macey tells how heightened government oversight has put a stranglehold on what is the best protection against malfeasance by self-serving management: the market itself. Corporate governance, he shows, is about keeping promises to shareholders; failure to do so results in diminished investor confidence, which leads to capital flight and other dire economic consequences.
Macey explains the relationship between corporate governance and the various market and nonmarket institutions and mechanisms used to control public corporations; he discusses how nonmarket corporate governance devices such as boards and whistle-blowers are highly susceptible to being co-opted by management and are generally guided more by self-interest and personal greed than by investor interests. In contrast, market-driven mechanisms such as trading and takeovers represent more reliable solutions to the problem of corporate governance. Inefficient regulations are increasingly hampering these important and truly effective corporate controls. Macey examines a variety of possible means of corporate governance, including shareholder voting, hedge funds, and private equity funds. "Corporate Governance" reveals why the market is the best guardian of shareholder interests.
目次
Preface vii INTRODUCTION: Corporate Governance as Promise 1 CHAPTER 1: The Goals of Corporate Governance: The Dominant Role of Equity 18 CHAPTER 2: Corporate Law and Corporate Governance 28 CHAPTER 3: Institutions and Mechanisms of Corporate Governance: A Taxonomy 46 CHAPTER 4: Boards of Directors 51 CHAPTER 5: Case Studies on Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance 69 CHAPTER 6: Dissident Directors 90 CHAPTER 7: Formal External Institutions of Corporate Governance: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Stock Exchanges, and the Credit-Rating Agencies 105 CHAPTER 8: The Market for Corporate Control 118 CHAPTER 9: Initial Public Offerings and Private Placements 127 CHAPTER 10: Governance by Litigation: Derivative Lawsuits 130 CHAPTER 11: Accounting, Accounting Rules, and the Accounting Industry 155 CHAPTER 12: Quirky Governance: Insider Trading, Short Selling, and Whistle-blowing 165 CHAPTER 13: Shareholder Voting 199 CHAPTER 14: The Role of Banks and Other Lenders in Corporate Governance 223 CHAPTER 15: Hedge Funds and Private Equity 241 CONCLUSION 274 Notes 279 Index 325
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