Games, strategies, and decision making
著者
書誌事項
Games, strategies, and decision making
Worth, c2009
大学図書館所蔵 全15件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This new text on game theory introduces and develops the key concepts with a minimum of mathematics. Students are presented with empirical evidence, anecdotes and strategic situations to help them apply theory and gain a genuine insight into human behaviour. The book provides a diverse collection of examples and scenarios from history, literature, sports, crime, theology, war, biology, and everyday life. These examples come with rich context that adds real-world meat to the skeleton of theory. Each chapter begins with a specific strategic situation and is followed with a systematic treatment that gradually builds understanding of the concept.
目次
PART I: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS Introduction to Strategic Reasoning Building A Model of A Strategic Situation PART II: SOLVING STRATEGIC FORM GAMES Eliminating the Impossible:Solving A Game When Rationality is Common Knowledge Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two Or Three Players Stable Play:Nash Equilibria in Discrete N-Player Games Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Continuous Games Keep 'Em Guessing: Randomized Strategies PART III: SOLVING EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES Taking Turns: Sequential Games of Perfect Information Taking Turns in the Dark: Sequential Games of Imperfect Information PART IV: GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION I Know Something You Don't Know: Games with Private Information What You Do Tells Me Who You Are: Signaling Games Lies and the Lying Liars that Tell Them: Cheap Talk Games PART V: REPEATED GAMES Playing Forever: Repeated Interaction with Infinitely-Lived Players Cooperation and Reputation: Applications of Repeated Interaction with Infinitely-Lived Players Interaction in Infinitely-Lived Institutions PART VI: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Evolutionary Game Theory and Biology: Replicator Dynamics
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