Principles of conflict economics : a primer for social scientists
著者
書誌事項
Principles of conflict economics : a primer for social scientists
Cambridge University Press, 2009
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全17件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-306) and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Conflict economics contributes to an understanding of violent conflict in two important ways. First, it applies economic analysis to diverse conflict activities such as war, arms races, and terrorism, showing how they can be understood as purposeful choices responsive to underlying incentives. Second, it treats appropriation as a fundamental economic activity, joining production and exchange as a means of wealth acquisition. Drawing on a half-century of scholarship, this book presents a primer on the key themes and principles of conflict economics. Although much work in the field is abstract, the book is made accessible to a broad audience of scholars, students and policymakers by relying on historical data, relatively simple graphs and intuitive narratives. In exploring the interdependence of economics and conflict, the book presents current perspectives of conflict economics in novel ways and offers new insights into economic aspects of violence.
目次
- 1. Introduction: definition and scope of conflict economics
- 2. Production possibilities and the guns versus butter tradeoff
- 3. Rational choice and equilibrium
- 4. Fundamentals of game theory
- 5. A bargaining model of conflict
- 6. Conflict between states
- 7. Civil war and genocide
- 8. Terrorism
- 9. Geography and technology of conflict
- 10. Arms rivalry, proliferation, and arms control
- 11. Military alliances
- 12. Conflict success functions and the theory of appropriation possibilities
- Appendix A. Statistical methods
- Appendix B. A more formal bargaining model of conflict.
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