Moral disagreement

著者

• Tersman, Folke

書誌事項

Moral disagreement

Folke Tersman

（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）

Cambridge University Press, 2009

• pbk.

注記

First published 2006, this digitally printed version 2009 (Paperback re-issue)

Includes bibliographical references and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker.

目次

• Preface
• 1. Realism and irrealism
• 2. The case for radical moral disagreement
• 3. Explaining and predicting disagreement
• 4. The argument from inaccessibility
• 5. The argument from ambiguity
• 6. Attributing moral judgments
• References
• Index.

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

• NII書誌ID(NCID): BA90907078
• ISBN:
  • 9780521115551
• 出版国コード: uk
• タイトル言語コード: eng
• 本文言語コード: eng
• 出版地: Cambridge
• ページ数/冊数: xvii, 141 p.
• 大きさ: 23 cm
• 分類:
  • DC22 : 170.42
• 件名:
  • LCSH : Ethics
• 親書誌ID:
  • BA00372337