Imperfect union : representation and taxation in multilevel governments
著者
書誌事項
Imperfect union : representation and taxation in multilevel governments
（Political economy of institutions and decisions）
Cambridge University Press, 2009
- : pbk
- : hardback
大学図書館所蔵 全20件
注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 233-245) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Imperfect Union offers the first political theory of special purpose jurisdictions, which constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. Collectively, special purpose governments have more civilian employees than the federal government and spend more than all city governments combined. The proliferation of special purpose jurisdictions has fundamentally altered the nature of representation and taxation in local government. Citizens today are commonly represented by dozens - in some cases hundreds - of local officials in multiple layers of government. As a result, political participation in local elections is low and special interest groups associated with each function exert disproportionate influence. With multiple special-interest governments tapping the same tax base, the local tax base takes on the character of a common-pool resource, leading to familiar problems of overexploitation. Strong political parties can often mitigate the common-pool problem by informally coordinating the policies of multiple overlapping governments.
目次
- 1. Introduction: into the fiscal common fund
- 2. What's special about special-purpose governments?
- 3. A political theory of special-purpose government
- 4. Piling on: the problem of concurrent taxation
- 5. Specializing and quality
- 6. Governing the fiscal commons
- 7. Conclusion.
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