Agency and deontic logic

書誌事項

Agency and deontic logic

John F. Horty

Oxford University Press, 2009, c2001

  • : pbk

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-187) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

John Horty effectively develops deontic logic (the logic of ethical concepts like obligation and permission) against the background of a formal theory of agency. He incorporates certain elements of decision theory to set out a new deontic account of what agents ought to do under various conditions over extended periods of time. Offering a conceptual rather than technical emphasis, Horty's framework allows a number of recent issues from moral theory to be set out clearly and discussed from a uniform point of view.

目次

  • 1. OVERVIEW
  • 2. INDETERMINISM AND AGENCY
  • 2.1 Branching time
  • 2.1.1 Frames and Models
  • 2.1.2 2.1.2 Propositions
  • 2.2 Individual agency
  • 2.2.1 Agents and choices
  • 2.2.2 Stit operators
  • 2.2.3 Some logical considerations
  • 2.3 Individual ability
  • 2.3.1 Kenny's objections
  • 2.3.2 Brown's theory
  • 2.3.3 Refraining and ability
  • 2.4 Group agency and ability
  • 2.4.1 Group actions
  • 2.4.2 A group agency operator
  • 3. OUGHT TO BE
  • 3.1 The standard theory
  • 3.2 A utilitarian theory
  • 3.2.1 General models
  • 3.2.2 Utilitarian models
  • 3.2.3 Logic of the utilitarian ought
  • 3.3 The Meinong/Chisholm analysis
  • 3.3.1 The analysis
  • 3.3.2 Some logical features
  • 3.4 Evaluating the analysis
  • 3.4.1 Agency in the complement
  • 3.4.2 The gambling problem
  • 4. OUGHT TO DO
  • 4.1 Dominance
  • 4.1.1 Ordering the propositions
  • 4.1.2 A sure-thing argument
  • 4.1.3 Ordering the actions
  • 4.2 Dominance act utilitarianism
  • 4.2.1 Optimal actions
  • 4.2.2 The finite choice condition
  • 4.3 A new deontic operator
  • 4.3.1 The definition
  • 4.3.2 Deontic logic and act utilitarianism
  • 4.3.3 Logic of the dominance ought
  • 4.4 Independence
  • 4.4.1 Independence and conditionals
  • 4.4.2 Conditionals and sure-thing reasoning
  • 4.4.3 Refining the analysis
  • 5. CONDITIONAL OUGHTS
  • 5.1 Conditionally optimal actions
  • 5.2 A conditional operator
  • 5.2.1 The definition
  • 5.2.2 Some logical considerations
  • 5.3 Two patterns of argument
  • 5.3.1 The action argument
  • 5.3.2 The ought argument
  • 5.4 Orthodox act utilitarianism
  • 5.4.1 An example
  • 5.4.2 The definition
  • 5.4.3 An orthodox deontic operator
  • 6. GROUP OUGHTS
  • 6.1 Optimal group actions
  • 6.2 Individual and group act utilitarianism
  • 6.3 Deontic operators for group oughts
  • 6.3.1 Definitions
  • 6.3.2 Some logical points
  • 6.4 Rule utilitarianism
  • 6.4.1 Formulating the theory
  • 6.4.2 Act and rule utilitarianism
  • 7. STRATEGIC OUGHTS
  • 7.1 Strategies
  • 7.1.1 Basic idea
  • 7.1.2 Limiting the range
  • 7.2 Strategies and choices
  • 7.2.1 Agency
  • 7.2.2 Ability
  • 7.3 Strategic dominance and optimality
  • 7.3.1 Dominance
  • 7.3.2 Optimality
  • 7.4 A strategic ought operator
  • 7.4.1 The definition
  • 7.4.2 Logical points
  • 7.4.3 Actualism and possibilism
  • A. Proofs of validities and propositions
  • A.1 Validities
  • A.2 Propositions
  • Bibliography
  • Index

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報
  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BA91625832
  • ISBN
    • 9780195391985
  • 出版国コード
    uk
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    Oxford, [U.K.]
  • ページ数/冊数
    xi, 192 p.
  • 大きさ
    24 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
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