Agency and deontic logic
著者
書誌事項
Agency and deontic logic
Oxford University Press, 2009, c2001
- : pbk
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-187) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
John Horty effectively develops deontic logic (the logic of ethical concepts like obligation and permission) against the background of a formal theory of agency. He incorporates certain elements of decision theory to set out a new deontic account of what agents ought to do under various conditions over extended periods of time. Offering a conceptual rather than technical emphasis, Horty's framework allows a number of recent issues from moral theory to be set out
clearly and discussed from a uniform point of view.
目次
- 1. OVERVIEW
- 2. INDETERMINISM AND AGENCY
- 2.1 Branching time
- 2.1.1 Frames and Models
- 2.1.2 2.1.2 Propositions
- 2.2 Individual agency
- 2.2.1 Agents and choices
- 2.2.2 Stit operators
- 2.2.3 Some logical considerations
- 2.3 Individual ability
- 2.3.1 Kenny's objections
- 2.3.2 Brown's theory
- 2.3.3 Refraining and ability
- 2.4 Group agency and ability
- 2.4.1 Group actions
- 2.4.2 A group agency operator
- 3. OUGHT TO BE
- 3.1 The standard theory
- 3.2 A utilitarian theory
- 3.2.1 General models
- 3.2.2 Utilitarian models
- 3.2.3 Logic of the utilitarian ought
- 3.3 The Meinong/Chisholm analysis
- 3.3.1 The analysis
- 3.3.2 Some logical features
- 3.4 Evaluating the analysis
- 3.4.1 Agency in the complement
- 3.4.2 The gambling problem
- 4. OUGHT TO DO
- 4.1 Dominance
- 4.1.1 Ordering the propositions
- 4.1.2 A sure-thing argument
- 4.1.3 Ordering the actions
- 4.2 Dominance act utilitarianism
- 4.2.1 Optimal actions
- 4.2.2 The finite choice condition
- 4.3 A new deontic operator
- 4.3.1 The definition
- 4.3.2 Deontic logic and act utilitarianism
- 4.3.3 Logic of the dominance ought
- 4.4 Independence
- 4.4.1 Independence and conditionals
- 4.4.2 Conditionals and sure-thing reasoning
- 4.4.3 Refining the analysis
- 5. CONDITIONAL OUGHTS
- 5.1 Conditionally optimal actions
- 5.2 A conditional operator
- 5.2.1 The definition
- 5.2.2 Some logical considerations
- 5.3 Two patterns of argument
- 5.3.1 The action argument
- 5.3.2 The ought argument
- 5.4 Orthodox act utilitarianism
- 5.4.1 An example
- 5.4.2 The definition
- 5.4.3 An orthodox deontic operator
- 6. GROUP OUGHTS
- 6.1 Optimal group actions
- 6.2 Individual and group act utilitarianism
- 6.3 Deontic operators for group oughts
- 6.3.1 Definitions
- 6.3.2 Some logical points
- 6.4 Rule utilitarianism
- 6.4.1 Formulating the theory
- 6.4.2 Act and rule utilitarianism
- 7. STRATEGIC OUGHTS
- 7.1 Strategies
- 7.1.1 Basic idea
- 7.1.2 Limiting the range
- 7.2 Strategies and choices
- 7.2.1 Agency
- 7.2.2 Ability
- 7.3 Strategic dominance and optimality
- 7.3.1 Dominance
- 7.3.2 Optimality
- 7.4 A strategic ought operator
- 7.4.1 The definition
- 7.4.2 Logical points
- 7.4.3 Actualism and possibilism
- A. Proofs of validities and propositions
- A.1 Validities
- A.2 Propositions
- Bibliography
- Index
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