Explaining executive pay : the roles of managerial power and complexity
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Explaining executive pay : the roles of managerial power and complexity
(Gabler Edition Wissenschaft)
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2006
- : pbk
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Note
Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral--Universität St. Gallen, 2006)
Includes bibliographical references (p. 183-207)
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Lukas Hengartner shows that both firm complexity and managerial power are associated with higher pay levels. This suggests that top managers are paid for the complexity of their job and that more powerful top managers receive pay in excess of the level that would be optimal for shareholders.
Table of Contents
The compansation setting process
Research review on executive pay
Research review on director pay
Are executives paid for the complexity of the job they have?
Can powerful managers extract rents?
Research methods and results
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