Game theory and public policy
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Game theory and public policy
Edward Elgar, c2009
Available at 26 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Game theory is useful in understanding collective human activity as the outcome of interactive decisions. In recent years it has become a more prominent aspect of research and applications in public policy disciplines such as economics, philosophy, management and political science, and in work within public policy itself. Here Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory with the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions in public policy.
In practice, the influence of game theory on public policy and related disciplines has been less a consequence of broad theorems than of insightful examples. Accordingly, the author offers a critical review of major topics from both cooperative and noncooperative game theory, including less-known ideas in noncooperative game theory and constructive proposals for new approaches. In so doing, he provides a toolkit for the analysis of public policy as well as a clearer understanding of the public policy enterprise itself.
The author's unique approach and treatment of game theory will be a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.
Table of Contents
Contents: Part I: Historical and Critical Survey 1. Objectives and Scope of the Book 2. Representing Games 3. A Brief Interpretive History of Game Theory 4. Nash Equilibrium and Public Policy 5. Correlated Equilibrium 6. Non-cooperative Sequential Games and Public Policy 7. Social Mechanism Design 8. Superadditive Games in Coalition Function Form 9. Imperfect Recall and Aggregation of Strategies 10. Strategy, Externality, and Rationality Part II: Encapsulated Cooperation 11. Coalition Formation and Stability 12. Bargaining, Weak Dynamics, and Consensus 13. Formal Aspects of Games in Partition Function Form 14. Coalitional Play 15. The Government Game 16. Toward Political Economy References Index
by "Nielsen BookData"