The counsel of rogues? : a defence of the standard conception of the lawyer's role

著者

    • Dare, Tim, LLB

書誌事項

The counsel of rogues? : a defence of the standard conception of the lawyer's role

Tim Dare

Ashgate, c2009

  • : hbk

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 1

この図書・雑誌をさがす

注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [161]-166) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

There is a widespread perception that even when lawyers are acting squarely within their roles, being good lawyers, they display the vices of dishonesty and deviousness. At the heart of the perception is the so called standard conception of the lawyer's role according to which lawyers owe special duties to their clients which render permissible, or even mandatory, acts that would otherwise count as morally impermissible. Many have concluded that the standard conception should be set aside. This book suggests that the moral implications of the standard conception are often mischaracterised. Critics suggest that the conception requires lawyers to secure any advantage the law can be made to give. But Dare offers a moral argument for the conception, according to which it justifies a more limited and moderate sphere of professional conduct than is normally supposed, allowing lawyers to preserve their integrity while giving proper weight to the role-differentiated permissions and obligations of their roles.

目次

  • Contents: The standard conception of the lawyer's role
  • The critique of the standard conception
  • The idea of role-obligation
  • The standard conception and the role of law
  • The standard conception and the client-professional relationship
  • Virtue ethics, legal ethics, and Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird
  • Detachment, distance and integrity
  • Conclusion: a response to the critique
  • Bibliography
  • Index.

「Nielsen BookData」 より

詳細情報

  • NII書誌ID(NCID)
    BB01691815
  • ISBN
    • 9780754649007
  • LCCN
    2009000933
  • 出版国コード
    uk
  • タイトル言語コード
    eng
  • 本文言語コード
    eng
  • 出版地
    Farnham
  • ページ数/冊数
    vii, 171 p.
  • 大きさ
    24 cm
  • 分類
  • 件名
ページトップへ