Partisan bonds : political reputations and legislative accountability
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Partisan bonds : political reputations and legislative accountability
（Political economy of institutions and decisions）
Cambridge University Press, 2010
- : hbk
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Note
Bibliography: p. 223-236
Includes index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Political scientists have long painted American voters' dependence on partisan cues at the ballot box as a discouraging consequence of their overall ignorance about politics. Taking on this conventional wisdom, Jeffrey D. Grynaviski advances the provocative theory that voters instead rely on these cues because party brand names provide credible information about how politicians are likely to act in office, despite the weakness of formal party organization in the United States. Among the important empirical implications of his theory, which he carefully supports with rigorous data analysis, are that voter uncertainty about a party's issue positions varies with the level of party unity it exhibits in government, that party preferences in the electorate are strongest among the most certain voters, and that party brand names have meaningful consequences for the electoral strategies of party leaders and individual candidates for office.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Theory
- 3. Voter learning about parties
- 4. Party unity and the strength of party preferences
- 5. Reconciling candidate and party brand names
- 6. Brand names and party strategy
- 7. Conclusion.
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