Codes of the underworld : how criminals communicate

著者

書誌事項

Codes of the underworld : how criminals communicate

Diego Gambetta

Princeton University Press, c2009

大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全4件

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. [313]-326) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

How do criminals communicate with each other? Unlike the rest of us, people planning crimes can't freely advertise their goods and services, nor can they rely on formal institutions to settle disputes and certify quality. They face uniquely intense dilemmas as they grapple with the basic problems of whom to trust, how to make themselves trusted, and how to handle information without being detected by rivals or police. In this book, one of the world's leading scholars of the mafia ranges from ancient Rome to the gangs of modern Japan, from the prisons of Western countries to terrorist and pedophile rings, to explain how despite these constraints, many criminals successfully stay in business. Diego Gambetta shows that as villains balance the lure of criminal reward against the fear of dire punishment, they are inspired to unexpected feats of subtlety and ingenuity in communication. He uncovers the logic of the often bizarre ways in which inveterate and occasional criminals solve their dilemmas, such as why the tattoos and scars etched on a criminal's body function as lines on a professional rsum, why inmates resort to violence to establish their position in the prison pecking order, and why mobsters are partial to nicknames and imitate the behavior they see in mafia movies. Even deliberate self-harm and the disclosure of their crimes are strategically employed by criminals to convey important messages. By deciphering how criminals signal to each other in a lawless universe, this gruesomely entertaining and incisive book provides a quantum leap in our ability to make sense of their actions.

目次

Acknowledgments vii Introduction ix Abbreviations xxiii PART I: costly signals Chapter 1: Criminal Credentials 3 Chapter 2: The Power of Limits 30 Chapter 3: Information as Hostage 54 Chapter 4: Why Prisoners Fight (and Signal) 78 Chapter 5: Self-harm as a Signal 111 PART II: conventional signals Chapter 6: Conventional and Iconic Signals 149 Chapter 7: Protecting Easy-to-Fake Signals 174 Chapter 8: Criminal Trademarks 195 Chapter 9: Nicknames 230 Chapter 10: Why (Low) Life Imitates Art 251 Notes 275 Bibliography 313 Index 327

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