Oil is not a curse : ownership structure and institutions in Soviet successor states
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Oil is not a curse : ownership structure and institutions in Soviet successor states
(Cambridge studies in comparative politics)
Cambridge University Press, 2010
- : pbk
- : hard
Available at 20 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
-
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: pbk568.09||L9701232812
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 361-397) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership structure they choose to manage their mineral wealth and second, that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states. Each represents a significant departure from the conventional resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their respective developmental trajectories since independence demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent fiscal regimes.
Table of Contents
- 1. Rethinking the resource curse: ownership structure and institutions in mineral rich states
- 2. Fiscal regimes: taxation and expenditure in mineral rich states
- 3. State ownership with control versus private domestic ownership
- 4. Two version of rentierism: state ownership with control in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
- 5. Petroleum rents without rentierism: domestic private ownership in the Russian Federation
- 6. State ownership without control versus private foreign ownership
- 7. Eluding the obsolescing bargain: state ownership without control in Azerbaijan
- 8. Revisiting the obsolescing bargain: foreign private ownership in Kazakhstan
- 9. Taking domestic politics seriously: explaining ownership structure over mineral resources
- 10. The myth of the resource curse.
by "Nielsen BookData"