Control theory and dynamic games in economic policy analysis
著者
書誌事項
Control theory and dynamic games in economic policy analysis
Cambridge University Press, 2009, c1990
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 件 / 全3件
-
該当する所蔵館はありません
- すべての絞り込み条件を解除する
注記
"This digitally printed version 2009" -- T. p. verso
"Paperback re-issue" -- Backcover
Includes bibliographical references (p. 316-332) and indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This book, originally published in 1990, deals with the stabilisation and control of an economic system in a dynamic setting. Unlike studies which consider only the case of centralised policy-making, Professor Petit examines both the situation in which policy decisions are taken by a single policy-maker and the case of group policy-making. The wide-ranging economic implications of the use of these methods are thoroughly discussed. The tools of optimal control and differential game theory, and their advantages and drawbacks, are examined, along with methodological implications of introducing expectations into the policy problem. This lucid and comprehensive study of control theory and dynamic games will be of great use both to economists interested in learning mathematical methods and to mathematicians interested in their economic applications.
目次
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Preface
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Mathematical preliminaries: the state space
- 3. Static and dynamic controllability
- 4. Different approaches to dynamic policy analysis
- 5. Optimal control
- 6. The objective function
- 7. Applications of optimal control
- 8. Decentralised decisions and differential games
- 9. Applications of differential games
- 10. Optimal policies and expectations
- Notes
- References
- Index.
「Nielsen BookData」 より