Economics of public international law
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Economics of public international law
(Economic approaches to law, 28)(An Elgar research collection)
E. Elgar, c2010
Available at 13 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This major book - edited by a leading authority - presents a careful selection of papers which analyse international law from a rational choice perspective. Interdisciplinary in scope, it includes work by professors in law, political science and economics. It addresses the proposition that states act rationally and behave in ways that are in the interest of their populations or internal groups. Topics include international adjudication, human rights law, compliance with international law, sanctions andinternational legal responsibility.The book will be an essential source of reference for scholars and students working in international law, international relations and related fields.
Table of Contents
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Eric A. Posner
PART I COMPLIANCE
1. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner (1999), 'A Theory of Customary International Law'
2. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law'
PART II TREATIES
3. Oona A. Hathaway (2002), 'Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?'
4. Francesco Parisi and Catherine Sevcenko (2003), 'Treaty Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention'
5. Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons (2006), 'Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000'
PART III INSTITUTIONS
6. Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal (2000), 'The Concept of Legalization'
7. Andrew T. Guzman (2002), 'The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms'
8. Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo (2005), 'Judicial Independence in International Tribunals'
9. Giovanni Maggi and Massimo Morelli (2006), 'Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations'
10. Alan O. Sykes (2005), 'Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy'
11. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes (2007), 'An Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under International Law'
PART IV SECURITY
12. Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers (1992), 'Sanctions'
13. Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley (2001), 'Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action'
14. Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes (2005), 'Optimal War and Jus ad Bellum'
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