Moral realism as a moral doctrine
著者
書誌事項
Moral realism as a moral doctrine
（New directions in ethics, 2）
Wiley-Blackwell, 2009
- : hardcover
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. Moral realism - the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine.* Major new volume in our new series New Directions in Ethics* Takes on the big picture - defending the objectivity of ethics whilst rejecting the grounds of much of the existing debate between realists and anti-realists* Cuts across both ethical theory and metaethics* Distinguished by the quality of the scholarship and its ambitious range
目次
Preface. 1. Introduction. 2. Mind-Independence. 3. Determinate Correctness. 4. Uniform Applicability. 5. Invariance. 6. Transindividual Concurrence. 7. Impartiality. 8. Truth-Aptitude. 9. Further Dimensions of Ethical Objectivity? 10. Supervenience as an Ethical Phenomenon. References. Index.
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