Partisan balance : why political parties don't kill the U.S. Constitutional system
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書誌事項
Partisan balance : why political parties don't kill the U.S. Constitutional system
（Princeton lectures in politics and public affairs）
Princeton University Press, c2011
- : pbk
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注記
Height of pbk.: 23 cm
Includes bibliographical references (p. [191]-214) and index
Includes bibliographical footnotes
内容説明・目次
- 巻冊次
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ISBN 9780691144658
内容説明
With three independent branches, a legislature divided into two houses, and many diverse constituencies, it is remarkable that the federal government does not collapse in permanent deadlock. Yet, this system of government has functioned for well over two centuries, even through such heated partisan conflicts as the national health-care showdown and Supreme Court nominations. In "Partisan Balance", noted political scholar David Mayhew examines the unique electoral foundations of the presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives in order to provide a fresh understanding for the government's success and longstanding vitality. Focusing on the period after World War II, and the fate of legislative proposals offered by presidents from Harry Truman to George W. Bush, Mayhew reveals that the presidency, Senate, and House rest on surprisingly similar electoral bases, with little difference in their partisan textures as indexed by the presidential popular vote cast in the various constituencies.
Both congressional chambers have tilted a bit Republican, and while White House legislative initiatives have fared accordingly, Mayhew shows that presidents have done relatively well in getting their major proposals enacted. Over the long haul, the Senate has not proven much more of a stumbling block than the House. Arguing that the system has developed a self-correcting impulse that leads each branch to pull back when it deviates too much from other branches, Mayhew contends that majoritarianism largely characterizes the American system. The wishes of the majority tend to nudge institutions back toward the median voter, as in the instances of legislative districting, House procedural reforms, and term limits for presidents and legislators.
目次
List of Illustrations ix Acknowledgments xi Introduction xiii CHAPTER 1: The Electoral Bases 1 CHAPTER 2: President and Congress 34 CHAPTER 3: House and Senate I 80 CHAPTER 4: House and Senate II 121 CHAPTER 5: Reform 165 APPENDIX: Sources for Presidential Proposals 191 Index 215
- 巻冊次
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: pbk ISBN 9780691157986
内容説明
With three independent branches, a legislature divided into two houses, and many diverse constituencies, it is remarkable that the federal government does not collapse in permanent deadlock. Yet, this system of government has functioned for well over two centuries, even through such heated partisan conflicts as the national health-care showdown and Supreme Court nominations. In Partisan Balance, noted political scholar David Mayhew examines the unique electoral foundations of the presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives in order to provide a fresh understanding for the government's success and longstanding vitality. Focusing on the period after World War II, and the fate of legislative proposals offered by presidents from Harry Truman to George W. Bush, Mayhew reveals that the presidency, Senate, and House rest on surprisingly similar electoral bases, with little difference in their partisan textures as indexed by the presidential popular vote cast in the various constituencies.
Both congressional chambers have tilted a bit Republican, and while White House legislative initiatives have fared accordingly, Mayhew shows that presidents have done relatively well in getting their major proposals enacted. Over the long haul, the Senate has not proven much more of a stumbling block than the House. Arguing that the system has developed a self-correcting impulse that leads each branch to pull back when it deviates too much from other branches, Mayhew contends that majoritarianism largely characterizes the American system. The wishes of the majority tend to nudge institutions back toward the median voter, as in the instances of legislative districting, House procedural reforms, and term limits for presidents and legislators.
目次
List of Illustrations ix Acknowledgments xi Introduction xiii CHAPTER 1: The Electoral Bases 1 CHAPTER 2: President and Congress 34 CHAPTER 3: House and Senate I 80 CHAPTER 4: House and Senate II 121 CHAPTER 5: Reform 165 APPENDIX: Sources for Presidential Proposals 191 Index 215
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