States of credit : size, power, and the development of European polities
著者
書誌事項
States of credit : size, power, and the development of European polities
（The Princeton economic history of the Western world）
Princeton University Press, c2011
- : hbk
- : pbk
大学図書館所蔵 全21件
注記
Bibliography: p. [167]-186
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
States of Credit provides the first comprehensive look at the joint development of representative assemblies and public borrowing in Europe during the medieval and early modern eras. In this pioneering book, David Stasavage argues that unique advances in political representation allowed certain European states to gain early and advantageous access to credit, but the emergence of an active form of political representation itself depended on two underlying factors: compact geography and a strong mercantile presence. Stasavage shows that active representative assemblies were more likely to be sustained in geographically small polities. These assemblies, dominated by mercantile groups that lent to governments, were in turn more likely to preserve access to credit. Given these conditions, smaller European city-states, such as Genoa and Cologne, had an advantage over larger territorial states, including France and Castile, because mercantile elites structured political institutions in order to effectively monitor public credit.
While creditor oversight of public funds became an asset for city-states in need of finance, Stasavage suggests that the long-run implications were more ambiguous. City-states with the best access to credit often had the most closed and oligarchic systems of representation, hindering their ability to accept new economic innovations. This eventually transformed certain city-states from economic dynamos into rentier republics. Exploring the links between representation and debt in medieval and early modern Europe, States of Credit contributes to broad debates about state formation and Europe's economic rise.
目次
Illustrations ix Acknowledgments xi CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 1 Representation, Scale, and Control 6 The Evolution and Importance of Public Credit 9 Representative Assemblies in City-States and Territorial States 11 Geographic Scale and Merchant Power 14 Broad Sample Evidence 16 Origins of City-States 18 Case Study Evidence 20 Plan of the Book 24 CHAPTER TWO: The Evolution and Importance of Public Credit 25 Why Credit Was Important 25 When Did States First Borrow Long-Term? 29 The Cost of Borrowing 38 Economic Explanations for the City-State Advantage 43 Summary 46 CHAPTER THREE: Representative Assemblies in Europe, 1250-1750 47 Origins of Representative Assemblies 48 Prerogatives of Representative Assemblies 54 Who Was Represented? 61 The Intensity of Representation 65 Summary 68 CHAPTER FOUR: Assessing the City-State Advantage 70 Representation and Credit as an Equilibrium 72 Representative Institutions and the Creation of a Public Debt 77 Representative Institutions and the Cost of Borrowing 84 Variation within City-States 90 Summary 93 CHAPTER FIVE: Origins of City-States 94 The Rokkan/Tilly Hypothesis 95 The Carolingian Partition Hypothesis 95 Empirical Evidence 100 Reassessing the City-State Advantage 106 Summary 107 CHAPTER SIX: Three City-State Experiences 110 Merchant Oligarchy in Cologne 111 Genoa and the Casa di San Giorgio 117 Siena under the Rule of the Nine 125 Summary 131 CHAPTER SEVEN: Three Territorial State Experiences 132 France and the Rentes sur l'Hotel de Ville 132 Revisiting Absolutism in Castile 142 Accounting for Holland's Financial Revolution 150 Summary 154 CHAPTER EIGHT: Implications for State Formation and Development 156 The Debate on War and State Formation 156 Information, Commitment, and Democracy 158 Understanding Early Modern Growth 161 Bibliography 167 Index 187
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