The ethics of legal coercion
著者
書誌事項
The ethics of legal coercion
（Pallas paperbacks, 28）
D. Reidel , Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic, c1983
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注記
"Also published in 1983 in hardbound edition by Ridel in the series Philosophical studies series in philosophy, volume 26"--T.p. verso
Bibliography: p. 163-168
Includes indexes
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Are all of the commonly accepted aims of the use of law justifiable? Which kinds of behavior are justifiably prohibited, which kinds justifiably required? What uses of law are not defensible? How can the legitimacy or the ille gitimacy of various uses of law be explained or accounted for? These are questions the answering of which involves one in many issues of moral principle, for the answers require that one adopt positions - even if only implicitly - on further questions of what kinds of actions or policies are morally or ethically acceptable. The present work, aimed at questions of these kinds, is thus a study in the ethical evaluation of major uses of legal coercion. It is an attempt to provide a framework within which many questions about the proper uses of law may be fruitfully discussed. The framework, if successful, can be used by anyone asking questions about the defensibility of particular or general uses of law, whether from the perspective of someone considering whether to bring about some new legal provision, from the perspective of someone concerned to evaluate an eXisting provision, or from that of someone concerned more abstractly with questions about the appropriate substance of an ideal legal system. In addressing these and associated issues, I shall be exploring the extent to which an ethics based on respect for persons and their autonomy can handle satisfactorily the problems arising here.
目次
One: The Ethics of Respect for Persons.- 1.1. Introduction.- 1.2. Empirical Choice.- 1.3. Rational Choice.- 1.4. Rational Empirical Choice.- 1.5. Considered Choice.- 1.6. Unencumbered Choice.- Two: The Nature of a Limits Thesis.- 2.1. Introduction.- 2.2. Defining a Protected Sphere.- 2.3. Enforcing Morality versus Preventing Harm.- 2.4. Positive Morality versus Critical Morality.- 2.5. Which Critical Morality Should be Enforced?.- 2.6. Which Specific Kinds of Conduct Are Immoral?.- 2.7. Procedural Matters and Democracy.- 2.8. Conclusions.- Three: The Harm Principle.- 3.1. Harm and Interests.- 3.2. A Respect-for-Persons Conception of Harm.- Four: Legal Paternalism.- 4.1. The Principle of Paternalism.- 4.2. Paternalism and Law.- Five: The Welfare Principle.- 5.1. Introduction.- 5.2. The Basis of Positive Rights.- 5.3. The Plausibility of Positive Rights.- 5.4. Positive Rights and Individual Action.- 5.5. Positive Rights, the State, and Collective Action.- Six: The Principle of Community.- 6.1. Introduction.- 6.2. Laissez-Faire versus Collective Control.- 6.3. The Scope of Collective Control.- Seven: The Principle of Necessary Means.- 7.1. Introduction.- 7.2. The Principle of Necessary Means.- 7.3. Some Uses of the Principle.- Eight: Exclusionary Principles.- 8.1. Introduction.- 8.2. The Principle of Free Speech.- 8.3. The Generalized Exclusionary Principle.- Nine: Punishment.- 9.1. Introduction.- 9.2. Punishment and Respect for Persons.- 9.3. General Justifying Aim.- 9.4. Distribution.- 9.5. Severity.- Ten: Evaluating Legislation.- 10.1. The Principles of Legal Coercion.- 10.2. Taxation and the Provision of Public Goods.- 10.3. Victimless Crimes and the Enforcement of Popular Morality: Pornography.- 10.4. The Problem of Offensive Conduct.- 10.5. Concluding Remarks.- Notes.- Selected Bibliography.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.
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