Apoha : Buddhist nominalism and human cognition
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Apoha : Buddhist nominalism and human cognition
Columbia University Press, c2011
- : pbk. : alk. paper
- : cloth
Available at 15 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. [305]-320) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one property that all pots share? This seems unlikely, but without this common essence, it is difficult to see how we could teach someone to use the word "pot" or to see something as a pot. The Buddhist apoha theory tries to resolve this dilemma, first, by rejecting properties such as "potness" and, then, by claiming that the element uniting all pots is their very difference from all non-pots. In other words, when we seek out a pot, we select an object that is not a non-pot, and we repeat this practice with all other items and expressions. Writing from the vantage points of history, philosophy, and cognitive science, the contributors to this volume clarify the nominalist apoha theory and explore the relationship between apoha and the scientific study of human cognition. They engage throughout in a lively debate over the theory's legitimacy. Classical Indian philosophers challenged the apoha theory's legitimacy, believing instead in the existence of enduring essences. Seeking to settle this controversy, essays explore whether apoha offers new and workable solutions to problems in the scientific study of human cognition.
They show that the work of generations of Indian philosophers can add much toward the resolution of persistent conundrums in analytic philosophy and cognitive science.
Table of Contents
Preface Introduction, by Arindam Chakrabarti and Mark Siderits 1. How to Talk About Ineffable Things: Dignaga and Dharmakirti on Apoha, by Tom Tillemans 2. Dignaga's Apoha Theory: Its Presuppositions and Main Theoretical Implications, by Ole Pind 3. Key Features of Dharmakirti's Apoha Theory, by John D. Dunne 4. Dharmakirti's Discussion of Circularity, by Pascale Hugon 5. Apoha Theory as an Approach to Understanding Human Cognition, by Shoryu Katsura 6. The Apoha Theory as Referred to in the Nyayamanjari, by Masaaki Hattori 7. Constructing the Content of Awareness Events, by Parimal G. Patil 8. The Apoha Theory of Meaning: A Critical Account, by Prabal Kumar Sen 9. Apoha as a Naturalized Account of Concept Formation, by Georges Dreyfus 10. Apoha, Feature-Placing, and Sensory Content, by Jonardon Ganeri 11. Funes and Categorization in an Abstraction-Free World, by Amita Chatterjee 12. Apoha Semantics: Some Simpleminded Questions and Doubts, by Bob Hale 13. Classical Semantics and Apoha Semantics, by Brendan S. Gillon 14. Srughna by Dusk, by Mark Siderits Bibliography List of Contributors Index
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