Political parties, business groups, and corruption in developing countries
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Political parties, business groups, and corruption in developing countries
Oxford University Press, c2011
- : hardcover
- : pbk
Available at 17 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
-
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: hardcover312||Y1301281116
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 231-250) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Political corruption is one of the globe's most pressing yet seemingly permanent problems. It is a root cause of low growth and inequality, and plagues numerous nations throughout the world in varying degrees. In the past, it proved difficult to measure, and the political science literature on it was thin. In recent years, political scientists have greatly improved their analytical tools for analyzing and contextualizing corruption, and it is now a hot topic in the
discipline.
In Political Parties, Business Groups, and Corruption in Developing Countries, Vineeta Yadav examines corruption levels in sixty-four developing democracies over a twenty-year period. Her comparative focus is on Brazil and India, two of the most important developing nations. Drawing from a 2005-06 survey of Brazilian and Indian businesses that she conducted, Yadav finds that legislative institutions are central in determining the degree and type of corruption. Most importantly, in
legislatures where the party holds sway (as opposed to individual legislators), the level of corruption is higher. Party costs are higher than that of any one legislator, which explains part of the difference. More fundamentally, the fact that different systems offer different incentives to business groups and
legislatures explains why some systems are less corrupt than others. Given structural variation across democratic political systems, her book allows to predict which states are most susceptible to political corruption, and which reforms might best alleviate the problem.
Table of Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Institutions, Lobbying and Corruption: A Theoretical Framework
- 3 Case Studies: Legislative Institutions in Brazil and India
- 4 Brazil and India: Legislative Institutions and Lobbying Behavior
- 5 Brazil and India: Business Lobbying and Corruption
- 6 Institutions, Party Control and Corruption: The Empirical Evidence
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Appendix
by "Nielsen BookData"