Access points : an institutional theory of policy bias and policy complexity
著者
書誌事項
Access points : an institutional theory of policy bias and policy complexity
Oxford University Press, c2011
- : pbk
- : hardback
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注記
Bibliography: p. [187]-195
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Access Points develops a new theory about how democratic institutions influence policy outcomes. Access Point Theory argues that the more points of access that institutions provide to interest groups, the cheaper lobbying will be, and, thus, the more lobbying will occur. This will lead to more complex policy, as policymakers insert specific provisions to benefit special interests, and, if one side of the debate has a lobbying advantage, to more biased
policy, as the advantaged side is able to better take advantage of the cheaper lobbying. This book then uses Access Point Theory to explain why some countries have more protectionist and more complex trade policies than other; why some countries have stronger environmental and banking regulations than others; and
why some countries have more complicated tax codes than others. In policy area after policy area, this book finds that more access points lead to more biased and more complex policy. Access Points provides scholars with a powerful tool to explain how political institutions matter and why countries implement the policies they do.
目次
- Preface
- Part I: Access Point Theory
- Chapter 1. Political Institutions, Policy Bias, and Policy Complexity
- Chapter 2. What are Access Points and What are their Effects?
- Appendix to Chapter 2. Measuring Access Points
- Part II: Policy Bias
- Chapter 3. Access Points and Bias in Trade Policy
- Chapter 4. How Much Environmental Regulation Will a Country Have?
- Chapter 5. Regulating Banks: Capital-Friendly or Consumer-Friendly Rules?
- Part III: Policy Complexity
- Chapter 6. Complexity and the Tariff Schedule
- Chapter 7. Access Points and Tax Code Complexity
- Chapter 8. Conclusion
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