Government and markets : toward a new theory of regulation

Bibliographic Information

Government and markets : toward a new theory of regulation

[edited by] Edward J. Balleisen, David A. Moss

Cambridge University Press, 2012, c2010

  • : pbk

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Note

"First paperback edition 2012"--T.p. verso

Includes bibliographical references and index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences.

Table of Contents

  • Introduction
  • Part I. Beyond Market Failure: 1. Government failure vs. market failure: principles of regulation Joseph E. Stiglitz
  • 2. Effective regulation through credible cost-benefit analysis: the opportunity costs of superfund Michael Greenstone
  • 3. From 'state interference' to the 'return to the market': the rhetoric of economic regulation from the old Gilded Age to the new Mary O. Furner
  • 4. Lessons from Europe: some reflections on the European Union and the regulation of business Neil Fligstein
  • 5. Confidence games: how does regulation constitute markets? Daniel Carpenter
  • Part II. Beyond the Economic Theory of Politics: 6. The end of special interests theory and the beginning of a more positive view of democratic politics Donald Wittman
  • 7. Public choice: a critical reassessment Jessica Leight
  • 8. The paranoid style in the study of American politics David A. Moss and Mary Oey
  • 9. Law, policy, and cooperation Yochai Benkler
  • Part III. Beyond Command and Control: 10. What opportunity is knocking? Regulating corporate governance in the United States Mary A. O'Sullivan
  • 11. Taxation as a regulatory tool: lessons from environmental taxes in Europe Monica Prasad
  • 12. Redesigning regulation: a case study from the consumer credit market Elizabeth Warren
  • 13. Origins and regulatory consequences of the subprime crisis Barry Eichengreen
  • 14. Prospects for economic 'self-regulation' in the United States: an historian's view from the early twenty-first century Edward J. Balleisen
  • 15. Deregulation theories in a litigious society: American antitrust and tort Tony Freyer
  • 16. Markets in the shadow of the state: an appraisal of deregulation and implications for future research Marc Allen Eisner
  • Conclusion.

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Details

  • NCID
    BB0824923X
  • ISBN
    • 9780521280532
  • LCCN
    2009037726
  • Country Code
    uk
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Cambridge
  • Pages/Volumes
    xvi, 559 p.
  • Size
    23 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
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