The principle of sufficient reason : a reassessment
著者
書誌事項
The principle of sufficient reason : a reassessment
（Cambridge studies in philosophy / general editor, Ernest Sosa）
Cambridge University Press, 2011, c2006
- : paperback
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
"First published 2006"--T.p. verso
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and Peter van Inwagen's argument that the PSR entails modal fatalism. Pruss also provides a number of positive arguments for the PSR, based on considerations as different as the metaphysics of existence, counterfactuals and modality, negative explanations, and the everyday applicability of the PSR. Moreover, Pruss shows how the PSR would advance the discussion in a number of disparate fields, including meta-ethics and the philosophy of mathematics.
目次
- 1 Introduction
- 2. Reflection on some historical episodes
- 3. The CP and the PSR
- objections to the PSR
- 4. A modern version of the Hume objection
- 5. The anti-theological argument: 'There are no necessary beings'
- 6. Modal fatalism
- 7. Free will
- 8. Quantum mechanics
- 9. Turning Leibniz against the PSR
- 10. What survives the criticisms of the PSR?
- justification of the PSR
- 11. Self-evidence
- 12. Three Thomistic arguments
- 13. Modal arguments
- 14. Is the universe reasonable?
- 15. Explanation of negative states of affairs
- 16. The puzzle of the everyday applicability of the PSR
- 17. Inference to the best or only explanation
- 18. Inductive scepticism
- 19. The nature of possibility
- 20. Conclusions.
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