Comparative constitutional design
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Comparative constitutional design
(Comparative constitutional law and policy)
Cambridge University Press, 2012
- : hardback
Available at 15 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
Note
Includes bibliographical references and index
Contents of Works
- Introduction / Tom Ginsburg
- Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making / Jon Elster
- Does the process of constitution-making matter? / Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg
- Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions : power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy / Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw, and Barry R. Weingast
- The origins of parliamentary responsibility / Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian, and Anjali Thomas Bohlken
- Social foundations of China's living constitution / Randall Peerenboom
- The political economy of constitutionalism in a non-secularist world / Ran Hirschl
- Constitutional amendment rules : the denominator problem / Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden
- Collective-Action federalism : a general theory of Article I, Section 8 / Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel
- Personal laws and equality : the case of India / Martha C. Nussbaum
- Constitutional adjudication, Italian style / John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino
- Tyrannophobia / Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele
- Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? / Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James Melton
Description and Table of Contents
Description
This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg
- Part I. Design Processes: 2. Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making Jon Elster
- 3. What we know - and don't know - about design processes Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg
- Part II. How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions: 4. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw and Barry R. Weingast
- 5. The origins of parliamentary responsibility Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian and Anjali Thomas Bohlken
- 6. The social foundations of China's living constitution Randall Peerenboom
- 7. The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world Ran Hirschl
- Part III. Issues in Institutional Design: 8. Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden
- 9. Federalism: general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel
- 10. Personal laws and equality: the case of India Martha Nussbaum
- 11. Constitutional adjudication, Italian style John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino
- 12. Tyrannophobia Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele
- 13. Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and James Melton.
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