Evolutionary game dynamics : American Mathematical Society Short Course, January 4-5, 2011, New Orleans, Louisiana
著者
書誌事項
Evolutionary game dynamics : American Mathematical Society Short Course, January 4-5, 2011, New Orleans, Louisiana
(Proceedings of symposia in applied mathematics, v. 69 . AMS short course lecture notes : introductory survey lectures)
American Mathematical Society, c2011
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注記
Includes bibliographical references and index
収録内容
- Introduction to evolutionary game theory / Karl Sigmund
- Beyond the symmetric normal form : extensive form games, asymmetric games and games with continuous strategy spaces / Ross Cressman
- Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics / Josef Hofbauer
- On some global and unilateral adaptive dynamics / Sylvain Sorin
- Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics : foundations, determinist approximation, and equilibrium selection / William H. Sandholm
- Evolution of cooperation in finite populations / Sabin Lessard
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This volume is based on lectures delivered at the 2011 AMS Short Course on Evolutionary Game Dynamics, held January 4-5, 2011 in New Orleans, Louisiana. Evolutionary game theory studies basic types of social interactions in populations of players. It combines the strategic viewpoint of classical game theory (independent rational players trying to outguess each other) with population dynamics (successful strategies increase their frequencies). A substantial part of the appeal of evolutionary game theory comes from its highly diverse applications such as social dilemmas, the evolution of language, or mating behaviour in animals. Moreover, its methods are becoming increasingly popular in computer science, engineering, and control theory. They help to design and control multi-agent systems, often with a large number of agents (for instance, when routing drivers over highway networks or data packets over the Internet). While these fields have traditionally used a top down approach by directly controlling the behaviour of each agent in the system, attention has recently turned to an indirect approach allowing the agents to function independently while providing incentives that lead them to behave in the desired way. Instead of the traditional assumption of equilibrium behaviour, researchers opt increasingly for the evolutionary paradigm and consider the dynamics of behaviour in populations of agents employing simple, myopic decision rules.
目次
Introduction to evolutionary game theory by K. Sigmund
Beyond the symmetric normal form: Extensive form games, asymmetric games and games with continuous strategy spaces by R. Cressman
Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics by J. Hofbauer
On some global and unilateral adaptive dynamics by S. Sorin
Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: Foundations, deterministic approximation, and equilibrium selection by W. H. Sandholm
Evolution of cooperation in finite populations by S. Lessard
Index
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