Robust mechanism design : the role of private information and higher order beliefs

Author(s)

Bibliographic Information

Robust mechanism design : the role of private information and higher order beliefs

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris ; [foreword by Eric S. Maskin]

(World scientific series in economic theory, v. 2)

World Scientific, c2012

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Note

Includes bibliographical references and indexes

Description and Table of Contents

Description

Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.

Table of Contents

  • Mechanism Design
  • Game Theory
  • Auction Theory
  • Implementation
  • Private Information
  • First and Higher-Order Belief
  • Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
  • Ex Post Equilibrium
  • Rationalizability
  • Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
  • Private Value
  • Interdependent Value
  • Common Value
  • Belief-Free Mechanisms.

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Details

  • NCID
    BB09080848
  • ISBN
    • 9789814374583
  • LCCN
    2012005125
  • Country Code
    si
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    Singapore
  • Pages/Volumes
    xvii, 452 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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