Congressional parties, institutional ambition, and the financing of majority control
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Congressional parties, institutional ambition, and the financing of majority control
University of Michigan Press, c2012
- : cloth : alk. paper
Available at / 4 libraries
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National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: cloth : alk. paper314.86||H5101298253
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Institute of Social Science Library, the University of Tokyo図書
: cloth : alk. paperCa:2802:666510908046
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Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-295) and index
Contents of Works
- Introduction
- Parties, incumbents, and campaign finance in American politics
- Majority status and institutional power
- The growth of member giving
- Brother, can you spare a thousand? who gives to whom?
- Getting ahead by giving a lot: party goals and advancement in the House
- Leveraging funds to pay for the new party fundraising expectations
- Redistribution and the value of a house career
- Beyond legislating
Description and Table of Contents
Description
With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies. Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson analyze this development and discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving.
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