Congressional parties, institutional ambition, and the financing of majority control
著者
書誌事項
Congressional parties, institutional ambition, and the financing of majority control
University of Michigan Press, c2012
- : cloth : alk. paper
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 263-295) and index
収録内容
- Introduction
- Parties, incumbents, and campaign finance in American politics
- Majority status and institutional power
- The growth of member giving
- Brother, can you spare a thousand? who gives to whom?
- Getting ahead by giving a lot: party goals and advancement in the House
- Leveraging funds to pay for the new party fundraising expectations
- Redistribution and the value of a house career
- Beyond legislating
内容説明・目次
内容説明
With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies. Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson analyze this development and discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving.
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