Body, mind and self in Hume's critical realism
著者
書誌事項
Body, mind and self in Hume's critical realism
（Philosophische Analyse = Philosophical analysis / herausgegeben von Herbert Hochberg ... [et al.], Bd. 22）
Ontos, 2008
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注記
Bibliography: p. [507]-533
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations, is argued, must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct.In particular, it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.
目次
- Self as Substance
- Nominalism and Acquaintance
- From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hune: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism
- The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems
- Hume's Positive Account of the Self.
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