Reduction in philosophy of mind : a pluralistic account
著者
書誌事項
Reduction in philosophy of mind : a pluralistic account
（Epistemische Studien : Schriften zur Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie / edited by Michael Esfeld, Stephan Hartmann, Mike Sandbothe, Bd. 24）
Ontos, c2011
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注記
Bibliography: p. 173-189
内容説明・目次
内容説明
The notion of reduction continues to play a key role in philosophy of mind and philosophy of cognitive science. Supporters of reductionism claim that psychological properties or explanations reduce to neural properties or explanations, while anti-reductionists claim that such reductions are not possible. In this book, I apply recent developments in philosophy of science, particularly the mechanistic explanation paradigm and the interventionist theory of causation, to reassess the traditional approaches to reduction in philosophy of mind. I then elaborate and defend a pluralistic framework for philosophy of mind, and show how reductionist ideas can be incorporated into it. This leads to a novel synthesis of pluralism and reductionism that I call pluralistic physicalism.
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