Debating self-knowledge

著者

書誌事項

Debating self-knowledge

Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs

Cambridge University Press, 2012

  • : hardback

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注記

Includes bibliographical references (p. 227-230) and index

内容説明・目次

内容説明

Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology.

目次

  • Introduction
  • 1. Brains in a vat Anthony Brueckner
  • 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Gary Ebbs
  • 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Anthony Brueckner
  • 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats Gary Ebbs
  • 5. Trying to get outside your own skin Anthony Brueckner
  • 6. Can we take our words at face value? Gary Ebbs
  • 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Anthony Brueckner
  • 8. Is scepticism about self-knowledge coherent? Gary Ebbs
  • 9. The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge Anthony Brueckner
  • 10. Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining Gary Ebbs
  • 11. Scepticism about self-knowledge redux Anthony Brueckner
  • 12. Self-knowledge in doubt Gary Ebbs
  • 13. Looking back Anthony Brueckner
  • Bibliography
  • Index.

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