Incompatibilism's allure : principal arguments for incompatibilism

Author(s)

• Haji, Ishtiyaque

Bibliographic Information

Incompatibilism's allure : principal arguments for incompatibilism

Ishtiyaque Haji

（Critical issues in philosophy）

Broadview Press, c2009

Note

Bibliography: p. 209-215

Includes index

Description and Table of Contents

Description

The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. Incompatibilism's Allure provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling account for incompatibilism's continuing allure.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ONE INTRODUCTION The Robert Harris Case The Ann/Beth Cases Responsibility, Causal Determinism, and Free Action Two Views About the Concept of Responsibility Free Action Causal Determinism Some Definitions: Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism Different Pathways to Incompatibilism Prospectus TWO THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT The Consequence Argument The Logical Modalities Peter van Inwagen's Version of the ConsequenceArgument A Problem Concerning the Interpretation of 'Can' The Hypothetical Sense of 'Can' The Categorical Sense of 'Can' The Reformulated Consequence Argument Control Active Control The Event Causal Theory of Action and Deviance Ultimate Control The Negative Conception of Ultimate Origination The Positive Conception of Ultimate Origination Compatibilist Conceptions of Ultimate Origination Assessing the Reformulated Consequence Argument The Basic Version of the Consequence Argument Appendix Local Miracle Compatibilism A.1 Local Miracle Compatibilism A.2 An Objection to Local Miracle Compatibilism THREE ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY The Consequence Argument and Freedom to do Otherwise Frankfurt-Type Examples and Freedom to do Otherwise The Dilemma Objection Mele and Robb's Reply to the Dilemma Objection Another Reply to the Dilemma Objection Luck and Alternative Possibilities FOUR THE DIRECT ARGUMENT Introduction The Direct Argument Transfer NR and Two-Path Cases David Widerker's Response to the Direct Argument Widerker's Concerns Reply to Widerker A New Counterexample On the Epistemic Condition of Moral Responsibility A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Obligation An Informal Presentation of the Counterexample to Transfer NR Filling in the Details of the Counterexample FIVE THE DEONTIC ARGUMENT Introduction The Deontic Argument Problems with the Deontic Argument Genuine Moral Dilemmas and "Ought" Implies "Can" Self-Imposed Impossibility and "Ought" Implies "Can" Changing Obligations with Passing Time Reply to the Objection Negative Duties and "Ought Not" Implies "Can Refrain From" Does Blameworthiness Require Wrongness and Does Praiseworthiness Require Obligatoriness? A Counterexample to the Principle that Blameworthiness Requires Wrongness Supererogatory and Suberogatory Actions The Coming Apart of Blameworthiness and Wrongness Blameworthiness and Frankfurt Examples SIX THE MANIPULATION ARGUMENT The Basic Contours of the Argument The Manipulation Argument Hard Incompatibilism and the Four-Case Argument McKenna's Hard-Line Response to the Argument The Hard-Line Reply Concerns with the Hard-Line Reply On Pereboom's Principle O of Ultimate Origination Principle O, Magical Agents, and God Principle O and Indoctrination Principle O and Control A Proposal SEVEN AUTHENTIC SPRINGS OF ACTION Toward a Soft-Line Reply to the Manipulation Argument Internalism versus Externalism Magical Agents and Global Manipulation: An Argument forInternalism Why the Argument Fails An Agency Requirement of Responsibility Children and the Authenticity of their Developing Evaluative Schemes Authentic Evolved Schemes Some Objections and Responses Evaluative Schemes and Personal Identity Evaluative Schemes and Drastic Change Evaluative Schemes and Ambiguity of 'Autonomy' Reply to the Magical Agents Argument Internalism's Domain A Soft-Line Reply to the Four-Case Argument EIGHT THE IMPOSSIBILITY ARGUMENT Introduction The Impossibility Argument Assessing the Impossibility Argument A Problem Concerning Magical Agents and God A Problem Concerning Agency A Problem Concerning Control The Impossibility Argument and Negative Ultimate Control The Impossibility Argument and Agent-Causal Ultimate Control The Impossibility Argument and Compatibilist Ultimate Control NINE LIBERTARIANISM AND THE LUCK OBJECTION Libertarianism and Luck Event Causal Modest Libertarianism Nonaction-Centered Modest Libertarianism Action Centered Modest Libertarianism Introducing the Luck Objection Luck, Explanation, and Control Akratic Action Modest Libertarianism, Luck, and Akratic Action Luck's Persistence Clarke's Hybrid Account and the Luck Objection Accounts of Causation Clarke's Hybrid Agent-Causal Account The Hybrid Account and Luck Mele's Daring Soft-Libertarian Reply Akratic Action vs. Actions that Manifest Agency Breakdown The Daring Reply Brief Wrap-Up References Index

by "Nielsen BookData"

• NCID: BB11026561
• ISBN:
  • 9781551119199
• LCCN: 2009293465
• Country Code: cn
• Title Language Code: eng
• Text Language Code: eng
• Place of Publication: Peterborough
• Pages/Volumes: 224 p.
• Size: 23 cm
• Classification:
  • LCC : BJ1451
  • DC22 : 123/.5
• Subject Headings:
  • LCSH : Free will and determinism
  • LCSH : Responsibility
• Parent Bibliography ID:
  • BB05537442