The president's czars : undermining congress and the constitution
著者
書誌事項
The president's czars : undermining congress and the constitution
(Studies in government and public policy)
University Press of Kansas, c2012
- : pbk
- : cloth
大学図書館所蔵 全3件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Faced with crises that would challenge any president, Barack Obama authorised "pay czar" Kenneth Feinberg to oversee the $20 billion fund for victims of the BP oil spill and to establish-and enforce-executive pay guidelines for companies that received $700 billion in federal bailout money. Feinberg's office comes with vastly expansive policy powers along with seemingly deep pockets; yet his position does not formally fit anywhere within our government's constitutional framework.
The very word "czar" seems inappropriate in a constitutional republic, but it has come to describe any executive branch official who has significant authority over a policy area, works independently of agency or Department heads, and is not confirmed by the Senate-or subject to congressional oversight. Mitchel Sollenberger and Mark Rozell provide the first comprehensive overview of presidential czars, tracing the history of the position from its origins through its initial expansion under FDR and its dramatic growth during the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
The President's Czars shows how, under pressure to act on the policy front, modern presidents have increasingly turned to these appointed officials, even though by doing so they violate the Appointments Clause and can also run into conflict with the non-delegation doctrine and the principle that a president cannot unilaterally establish offices without legislative support. Further, Sollenberger and Rozell contend that czars not only are ill-conceived but also disrupt a governing system based on democratic accountability.
A sobering overview solidly grounded in public law analysis, this study serves as a counter-argument to those who would embrace an excessively powerful presidency, one with relatively limited constraints. Among other things, it proposes the restoration of accountability-starting with significant changes to Title 3 of the U.S. Code, which authorises the president to appoint White House employees "without regard to any other provision of law."
Ultimately, the authors argue that czars have generally not done a good job of making the executive branch bureaucracy more effective and efficient. Whatever utility presidents may see in appointing czars, Sollenberger and Rozell make a strong case that the overall damage to our constitutional system is great-and that this runaway practice has to stop.
This book is part of the Studies in Government and Public Policy series.
「Nielsen BookData」 より