Design of constitutions
著者
書誌事項
Design of constitutions
(Economic approaches to law, 36)(An Elgar research collection)
Edward Elgar, c2013
大学図書館所蔵 全8件
  青森
  岩手
  宮城
  秋田
  山形
  福島
  茨城
  栃木
  群馬
  埼玉
  千葉
  東京
  神奈川
  新潟
  富山
  石川
  福井
  山梨
  長野
  岐阜
  静岡
  愛知
  三重
  滋賀
  京都
  大阪
  兵庫
  奈良
  和歌山
  鳥取
  島根
  岡山
  広島
  山口
  徳島
  香川
  愛媛
  高知
  福岡
  佐賀
  長崎
  熊本
  大分
  宮崎
  鹿児島
  沖縄
  韓国
  中国
  タイ
  イギリス
  ドイツ
  スイス
  フランス
  ベルギー
  オランダ
  スウェーデン
  ノルウェー
  アメリカ
注記
Includes bibliographical references
内容説明・目次
内容説明
Almost anywhere in the world, new constitutions are written and passed at almost any time. Over the last couple of years, an increasing number of economists have analysed constitutions based on an economic approach with an emphasis firstly on the (economic) effects of constitutions and followed by the factors determining their content. The contributions assembled in this volume go one step further: they ask how the knowledge gained over the last number of years can usefully be applied to constitutional design. This new branch could also be termed applied constitutional economics. Along with an original introduction, Professor Voigt has compiled a valuable research collection that will be of interest to scholars and practitioners in this growing field.
目次
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Stefan Voigt
PART I GETTING STARTED: STATE OF THE ART AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
1. Dennis C. Mueller (2005), 'Constitutional Political Economy in the European Union'
2. Donald L. Horowitz (2002), 'Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes'
3. Arend Lijphart (2002), 'The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy'
PART II THE RELEVANCE OF PROCEDURE FOR ...
4. Jon Elster (1995), 'Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process'
5. Stefan Voigt (2004), 'The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice-Towards a Comparative Analysis'
6. John M. Carey (2009), 'Does It Matter How a Constitution Is Created?'
7. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and Justin Blount (2009), 'Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?'
PART III BASIC RIGHTS
8. Lorenz Blume and Stefan Voigt (2007), 'The Economic Effects of Human Rights'
9. Avi Ben-Bassat and Momi Dahan (2008), 'Social Rights in the Constitution and in Practice'
PART IV STATE ORGANIZATION
A ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
10. Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini (2007), 'Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies'
11. Davide Ticchi and Andrea Vindigni (2010), 'Endogenous Constitutions'
B FORM OF GOVERNMENT
12. Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland and Guido Tabellini (1997), 'Separation of Powers and Political Accountability'
13. Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi (2004), 'Endogenous Political Institutions'
C THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGISLATURE: BICAMERALISM
14. Roger D. Congleton (2006), 'On the Merits of Bicameral Legislatures: Intragovernmental Bargaining and Policy Stability'
15. Cecilia Testa (2010), 'Bicameralism and Corruption'
D FEDERALISM
16. Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr and Barry R. Weingast (2005), 'Self-Enforcing Federalism'
17. Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (2005), 'Federalism and the Democratic Transition: Lessons from South Africa'
E DIRECT DEMOCRACY
18. Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer (2006), 'Direct Democracy: Designing a Living Constitution'
19. Lorenz Blume, Jens Muller and Stefan Voigt (2009), 'The Economic Effects of Direct Democracy - A First Global Assessment'
PART V BEYOND CONVENTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
20. Bruce Ackerman (2000), 'The New Separation of Powers'
21. Stefan Voigt and Eli M. Salzberger (2002), 'Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate Powers'
22. Tom Ginsburg (2006), 'Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law'
23. Stefan Voigt, Michael Ebeling and Lorenz Blume (2007), 'Improving Credibility by Delegating Judicial Competence - the Case of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council'
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