Private property and takings compensation : theoretical framework and empirical analysis
著者
書誌事項
Private property and takings compensation : theoretical framework and empirical analysis
E. Elgar, c2013
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注記
Includes bibliographical references (p. 173-188) and index
内容説明・目次
内容説明
From the foreword by Richard A. Epstein, New York University, US:
'Chang reviews the various standards and concludes that the proper measure, which is most invulnerable to political manipulation, calls for compensation at the fair market level of the property at its highest and best use, not just its current value.'
This innovative volume offers a thorough breakdown of the issues surrounding takings compensation - payments made as reimbursement for government takeover of private property. Using examples from New York City and Taiwan, Yun-chien Chang discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different methods of compensation and offers insightful suggestions for future implementation.
In an effort to fill the gaps in the current literature, the author identifies the five previously recognized types of compensation - zero, current value, fair market value, economic value and project value compensation - and uses a combination of previous research and new data to determine which is the most economically efficient. In doing so, he sets out a concrete methodology for the evaluation of takings compensation strategies that should prove vital to future policy decisions.
Students and professors of law, economics and public policy will find much of interest in the author's careful analysis, as will policymakers and other government officials working on similar land use issues.
Contents: Foreword by Richard Epstein; Introduction; Part I: Theoretical Framework; 1. A New Analytical Framework; 2. Condemnors: Three Behavioral Theories; 3. Condemnees: Four Types of Incentives; 4. Four Assessment Methods; Part II: Empirical Analysis; 5. Taiwan 1977-2009 and Condemnors' Incentives; 6. Taiwan 1954-77 and Condemnees' Incentives; 7. Settled Compensation in New York City and the Power of Hedonic Regression Models; 8. Adjudicated Compensation in New York City and the Failure of Appraisal Methods; Conclusion; References; Index
目次
Contents: Foreword by Richard Epstein Introduction Part I: Theoretical Framework 1. A New Analytical Framework 2. Condemnors: Three Behavioral Theories 3. Condemnees: Four Types of Incentives 4. Four Assessment Methods Part II: Empirical Analysis 5. Taiwan 1977-2009 and Condemnors' Incentives 6. Taiwan 1954-77 and Condemnees' Incentives 7. Settled Compensation in New York City and the Power of Hedonic Regression Models 8. Adjudicated Compensation in New York City and the Failure of Appraisal Methods Conclusion References Index
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