Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality
Author(s)
Bibliographic Information
Bankers, bureaucrats, and central bank politics : the myth of neutrality
(Cambridge studies in comparative politics)
Cambridge University Press, 2013
- : hardback
Available at 20 libraries
  Aomori
  Iwate
  Miyagi
  Akita
  Yamagata
  Fukushima
  Ibaraki
  Tochigi
  Gunma
  Saitama
  Chiba
  Tokyo
  Kanagawa
  Niigata
  Toyama
  Ishikawa
  Fukui
  Yamanashi
  Nagano
  Gifu
  Shizuoka
  Aichi
  Mie
  Shiga
  Kyoto
  Osaka
  Hyogo
  Nara
  Wakayama
  Tottori
  Shimane
  Okayama
  Hiroshima
  Yamaguchi
  Tokushima
  Kagawa
  Ehime
  Kochi
  Fukuoka
  Saga
  Nagasaki
  Kumamoto
  Oita
  Miyazaki
  Kagoshima
  Okinawa
  Korea
  China
  Thailand
  United Kingdom
  Germany
  Switzerland
  France
  Belgium
  Netherlands
  Sweden
  Norway
  United States of America
-
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies Library (GRIPS Library)
: hardback338.3||A1601331275
Note
Includes bibliographical references (p. 319-342) and index
Description and Table of Contents
Description
Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.
Table of Contents
- 1. Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance
- 2. Career theories of monetary policy
- 3. Careers and inflation in industrial democracies
- 4. Careers and the monetary policy process
- 5. Careers and inflation in developing countries
- 6. The uses of autonomy: what independence really means
- 7. Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy
- 8. The politics of central banker appointment
- 9. The politics of central banker tenure
- 10. Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion.
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